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"People Should Come to Work": 
Un-becoming Cartesian Subjects 
and Objects in Art Education 
Sara Wilson McKay 
When asked about how he wants viewers to engage with his often 
confrontational and difficult work, performance artist William Pope. L 
responded, "people should come to work" (personal communication, 
February 3, 2003). Preparedness to engage, to work, is at the core of 
considering the connection of art education and democracy. All too 
often that connection is reduced to the idea of beauty being in the "eye 
of the beholder" and you can do whatever you want-flit's a free 
country!" 
Re-imagining the work of art education, I want to talk of rhizomes 
and cyborgs, perhaps at the risk of alienating readers with raised 
eyebrows and being accused of hiding behind nouveau metaphors 
d'jour. But I want to argue for these metaphors because as Nietzsche 
(1979) suggested, metaphors have life spans: once a metaphor dies, it 
is time for a new metaphor. The rhizome and the cyborg do what 
metaphors help us do; think creatively and imaginatively about a 
previously known idea-in this case the Cartesian seeing subject and 
seen object. Too frequently art education and democracy get linked at 
the most superficial level. I argue for new complex metaphors, which 
require work, to help us understand the relationship of these ideas on 
a more profound level. 
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This essay examines the role of the eye of the beholder within art 
education. The eye here is never simply functioning as a "neutral" 
process of seeing, but rather it is the contemporary, politically-situated 
eye. How we see, what we choose to notice, recognize and perceive is 
very much a political act, one intrinsically linked to ideas of democracy. 
The association of vision with identification, definition and 
representation surely has larger implications than just what it means 
to see and be seen. Could what we see and not see (i.e. how we see) 
playa major role in what constructs the social status quo and continued 
undemocratic political arenas? How might art education figure into 
this equation? In what follows, I suggest two metaphors that can be 
powerful tools for re-envisioning ideas of socio-political art education. 
The Role of Conflict in Critical Education: What Does It 
Mean to Work? 
Reconceptualizing vision in order to open up new metaphors with 
implications for understandings of democracy, bell hooks (1995) 
explored in her book, Art on my mind: Visual politics, how to invent a 
decolonized self who can envision democratic freedom through art. 
In her pursuit of democratic participation, she demanded, "There must 
be a revolution in the way we see, the way we look" (p. 4). hooks further 
described this revolution of visual politics as beginning with "diverse 
programs of critical education that would stimulate collective 
awareness" (p.4). The current age of US mind-numbing standardized 
test-prep seems to undermine critical education that would stimulate 
such collective awareness. 
But awareness is not enough; there has to be new creation, the 
doing of something new. John Dewey (1916) suggested tha t democra tic 
education is characterized by novel communication among varied social 
groups. Further, it is the belief that, "every individual brings with him 
[sic] ... a new way of seeing and feeling that in its interaction with old 
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material creates something new, something previously not existing in 
experience" (Dewey, 1934, p. 108). A re-visioned understanding of 
democratic education also involves a solid pursuit of social justice: 
"democratic educators seek not simply to lessen the harshness of social 
inequities in schools, but to change the conditions that create them" 
(Apple & Beane, 1995, p. 11). 
The novel doing that democratic education requires is typically 
squelched by monocular vision, perpetuating the status quo of 
unquestioned cultural reproduction commonly known as public 
education. We are all too familiar with the status quo in education-
public education that fails to meet the needs of all students and provide 
opportunities for all students to be successful. Annually, as reports of 
standardized tests fill the pages of the newspapers, it is increasingly 
apparent that democratic education is really less of an educational goal 
than the hollow pursuit of numbers and percentiles. The current 
educational system is limited to the pursuit of Truth (capital T intended), 
that is somehow quantifiable and definable through our usual, 
normalized envisionings. These visions of "truth" seem to have "arisen 
from some immutable, infallible source" (Apple & Beane, 1995, p. 13). 
The status quo begs for new metaphors to dislodge the reified mythical 
truths. 
In his discussion of power /knowledge marked by their 
"constitutive interdependence" (p. 239), Foucault (1980) urged us to 
ask questions about what creates regimes of truth, not in hopes of 
escaping them, but so that we can change them. The questioning of 
Cartesian monocular vision is one attempt to isolate a large force in 
creating unthinking regimes of truth. The implicit trust of the eye and 
what it defines as knowledge is just such a factor in creating regimes of 
truth that must be questioned. 
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Cartesian Seeing Subjects/Seen Objects 
But from where did this knowledge-producing eye come? 
Descartes claims: "all knowledge is of the same nature throughout, 
and consists solely in combining what is self evident" (in Lloyd, 1989, 
p. 115). That which is "self-evident" to the eye is that which has 
imprisoned us in attitudes of knowing that require external 
authoritative structures. This external authority may take shape in 
categorical designations that disallow ambiguous knowing or it may 
simply be "that which is on the test." Either way, being told what and 
how to know supersedes experiential knowing; the latter frequently 
results in murky, unclear, non-categorical knowledge which is often 
less comfortable and requires more work. 
Lorraine Code (1991) expertly traces the origins of what is deemed 
"self-evident" to "visual metaphors-knowledge as illumination, 
knowledge as seeing, truth as light" (p. 140) at the root of Platonic 
philosophy. However she also recognizes that "a dual sense of vision 
is operative ... Vision at once severs the object from the subject through 
perceptual distance, and [yetl connects subject and object across a 
perceptual distance" (p. 141). The resounding effect in this schema of 
perceptual epistemology is that of distance between subject and object. 
Unpacking Foucault's "truths," requires an analysis of our 
inheritance from Rene Descartes with regard to this distance: the 
subject-object split. In Western philosophy, the cogito, "I think," 
establishes a dualistic condition between mind and matter. This 
"Cartesian split" also results in a split between the perceiver and the 
perceived, the legacy of which lies in terms of a seeing subject and a 
seen object (Jay, 1993). Thus a Cartesian worldview has reduced visual 
worlds to a singular visual field and consigned the body to objecthood 
in it. 
The impact of the Cartesian world view on discourse about vision 
valorizes the privileged objective eye that Plato conceptualized, and 
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fortifies the Western subject-object split yielding an institution of 
domination, hierarchy and exclusion. With such a strongly acculturated 
world view behind it, vision, particularly the gaze, has no doubt been 
manifested in an array of power-lobbying ways: the gaze controls; the 
gaze is not neutral; the gaze perpetuates patriarchy; the gaze claims 
epistemic relations. Clearly, an un-becoming of Cartesian seeing 
subjects and seen objects is required, but how do we begin? 
Intersubjectivity and Art Education 
A discussion of Cartesian perspectivism and its distance from 
experience begs the question of what might transpire if we begin to 
conceptualize something other than domination within a subject-object 
dichotomy. What happens to vision within an intersubjective 
world view as a new millennium ushers in the explosion of the virtual 
world where experience is an evolving concept? One cannot ask this 
question without thinking of Donna Haraway's ground-breaking essay 
"A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-feminism in 
the Late Twentieth Century" (1994). In this essay, Haraway calls for a 
feminist renegotiation of the visual through which the visual field is 
imploded: 
From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about 
lived social and bodily realities in which people are not 
afraid of their kinship with animals and machines, not afraid 
of permanently partial identities and contradictory 
standpoints. The political struggle is to see from both 
perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations 
and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. 
Single vision produces worse illusions than double vision 
or many-headed monsters (p. 429). 
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She goes on to define the cyborg as "a kind of disassembled and 
reassembled postmodern collective and personal self" (p. 437); identities 
give way to woven, networked affinities and the politics of partiality 
are bound up with intersubjectivity and vision: "the topography of 
subjectivity is multidimensional; so therefore is vision" (p.193). 
Art can be instrumental in breaking down the Cartesian split by 
requiring of us multipliCity in our visions and an extension of who we 
have defined ourselves to be. Art plays itself out through multiple 
connections and ruptures-connections by virtue of its multiple 
interpretations over time and space and ruptures within our perceptions 
of easy recognition, which jolt us out of our complicity. Feminist theorist 
Teresa de Lauretis (1988) asserted the necessity of aesthetic texts to 
help us "see difference differently" (p. 184) meaning artworks can help 
us explore and value that which is difficult to categorize. Film theorist 
Kaja Silverman (1996) maintained that artworks, "can intervene where 
we cannot. .. [and] at the same time, they are available to scrutiny and 
interrogation" (p. 4). These ideas about art suggest that indeed the 
field of art education holds great potential for the un-becoming of 
limited Cartesian vision and its implications. 
There are many reasons why examining the undemocratic effects 
of limited vision should take place within art education. In my 
experience, students tend to hesitate when they are asked to comment 
about their observations of a work of art. They are unsure of the 
quantifiable "right" answer that they feel they should know or at least 
be able to arrive at through some formulaic and reliable act of 
observation. They feel extreme discomfort that their usually powerful 
eye, skilled in the act of recognition, is somehow failing them. Rarely 
do educators point out that the processes of schooling, including several 
aspects of art education, are largely based upon a dismissal of 
complexity in favor of definitive looking. Even though art education 
is a discipline born of the multiplicity and complexity of art, often 
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educators give into the systems' (be they education or larger social 
institutions) and our students' resistance to ambiguity and multiple 
meanings by telling students what to see and how to see it. Opening 
up our vision to different views and beyond certainty asks us to explore 
a philosophy of alterity, of difference. 
A Philosophy of Alterity & Rhizomatic Anding 
British literary scholar Thomas Docherty (1996) refutes the 
Cartesian world view as a philosophy of identity, which is characterized 
by its pursuits of the categorical, a lack of the political, and a dismissal 
of temporal change (pp. 19-35). This valorizing of the homogenous is 
countered by Docherty'S postmodern proposal of a philosophy of 
alterity or difference. He, like other vision scholars (e.g. Jay 1993, Levin 
1993), acknowledges the proliferation of a philosophy of identity 
through issues of vision, which have grand repercussions for 
epistemology: 
here the eye is the location of truth. But, more importantly, 
truth is in an eye which is marked with a specific kind of 
power, fundamentally the power to reduce alterity to 
identity ... Such an eye cannot see alterity at all, in fact; rather, 
it sees only a mirrored reflection of the self, or it so 
successfully interiorizes alterity as to reduce it to identity. 
(pp. 104-5) 
A philosophy of identity is what keeps the subject-object 
dichotomy in operation by employing a sense of definition, a necessity 
of reductionism. A philosophy of alterity, on the other hand, creates 
opportunities to engage in the political and the possibilities of change. 
Docherty'S philosophy of difference resonates strongly with Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari's conception of the rhizome. In their 
collaborative thinking, rhizomatic grass is preferred to hierarchical trees: 
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a rhizome doesn't begin and doesn't end, but is always in 
the middle, between things, inter-being, intermezzo. The 
tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, exclusively 
alliance. The tree imposes the verb "to be," but the rhizome 
is woven together with conjunctions: 'and ... and ... and ... ' 
(1983, p. 57) 
The defining feature of a rhizome is its connection and 
heterogeneity: any point on a rhizome can be connected with any other. 
There are ruptures in rhizomes (or lines of flight) but these become 
part of the rhizome. For example, "we can never get rid of ants, because 
they form an animal rhizome that never ceases to reconstitute itself, 
even when almost completely destroyed" (p. 18). The rhizome enacts 
difference and seeks multiplicity. 
Another way of understanding the rhizome metaphor is through 
the AND. The conjunction "and" has profound significance in both the 
work of John Dewey and Deleuze and Guattari because of the 
privileging of a conjunctive method of understanding relations. They 
are interested in the interconnectedness, the interpenetrations of 
emerging conjunctions rather than attempting to fix identities with 
equalities. It is not that these conjunctions are predetermined or 
dualistic linkings of bipolar oppositions, but rather that the connectivity 
of concepts is predicated on an immanent inseparability of concepts. 
Of Dewey's many publications during his prolific lifetime, the majority 
of his titles are conceptually expressed by his use of the conjunction: 
"The Public and Its Problems/' "Experience and Nature/' "Democracy 
and Education," "Art and Civilization." The emphasis in these titles 
does not lie so much on the two topical elements as it does on the "and" 
of interpenetrations of the two concepts. Dewey does not assert a 
bifurcated philosophy of discrete elements but rather conceptualizes 
how the discrete and the continuous interconnect yielding a better 
articulated experience. 
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Likewise, in the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, the "and" 
has special importance. The "and" does a lot of work with regards to 
denying the conceptuality of a "whole." Multiplicity is at the heart of 
Deleuze and Guattari's obsession with the conjunction because any 
singularity is always a multiplicity. Therefore, the conjunction exercises 
a necessary complexity in any encounter. 
AND isn't even a specific conjunction or relation, it brings 
in all relations, there are as many relations as ANDS, AND 
doesn't just upset all relations, it upsets being, the verb ... 
and so on. AND, "and ... and ... and ... " is precisely a 
creative stammering, a foreign use of language, as opposed 
to a conformist and dominant use of the verb "to be." AND 
is of course diversity, multiplicity, the destruction of 
identities. (Deleuze 1990, p. 44) 
There is a necessity in rhizomatic "anding" to commit to the 
complex and non-definitive ways of looking in order to cultivate an 
understanding of vision, which induces double vision, or confusion-
not unlike Haraway's cyborg who sees multidimensionally. This kind 
of commitment to the unclear, the ambiguous in vision, creates room 
for those choosing objectification, those rejecting it, those unaware of 
its process and those deliberately seeing otherwise. In short, by 
dethroning the Cartesian gaze of its unique corner on the perceptual 
market, its existence is not disallowed, but rather diminished in power 
by promoting multiple ways of perceiving. 
However, it is often not desirable or possible to commit to the 
confusing state of a milieu composed of multiple choices and multiple 
meanings. This very point is the focus of Susan Bordo's essay 
"Feminism, Postmodernism and Gender Skepticism" (1993). After 
dismissing the "view from nowhere," which she equates with Cartesian 
(and male) constriction of the possibilities for knowledge, she equally 
refutes a "dream of everywhere" marked by "recognition of interpretive 
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multiplicity, of the indeterminacy and heterogeneity of cultural meaning 
and meaning-production" (p. 460). She says this not in denial of 
perspectival seeing and knowing, but rather: 
this is an inescapable fact of human embodiment, as 
Nietzsche was the first to point out: "The eye ... in which 
the active and interpreting forces, through which alone 
seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be 
lacking [is] an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a 
perspectival seeing, only a perspectival knowing." This 
selectivity, moreover, is never innocent. We always "see" 
from points of view that are invested with our social, political 
and personal interests, inescapably -centric in one way or 
another, even in the desire to do justice to heterogeneity. (p. 
463) 
Bordo applauds Haraway's conception of the cyborg as an 
ambiguous entity but warns against hints of ideal perspectivism from 
any position. As indicated in her citation of Nietzsche above, such 
perspectivism is unavoidable because that is the very thing which 
makes seeing, seeing something, that is to say, meaningful. 
Perspectivism is not the problem. Rather, it is our attitude toward 
perspectivism that dethrones spectator ideas of knowledge. 
With this realization and my desire to hedge against tendencies 
for perspectives to become totalizing perspectives, I argue for a 
committed attitude to the confusing and the connective so as to more 
fully articulate the important role of art education in the rejection of 
reductive learning in classrooms and the production instead of an 
attitude of openness to difficulty and difference in education generally 
and in a democracy more broadly. In William Pope. L's words, I argue 
that "people should come to work." 
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The Power of Perspective: 
Art Crawling and William Pope. L 
Performance artist William Pope. L has created art crawls in a 
variety of cities across the country drawing attention to what he deems 
"the privilege of being a vertical person." On February 1, 2003, Houston, 
Texas was the site for such an event, in which William Pope. L, and for 
the first time volunteer crawl teams, crawled from Freedman's Town 
to Downtown Houston, a 10-block stretch connecting a dilapidated 
historic area of Houston's black community with the shiny Houston 
skyscrapers, including Enron's now vacant tower. 
In an Art Education and Technology class in Spring 2003, I 
encouraged my students to attend the art crawl and/ or visit William 
Pope. 1's mid-career retrospective at a local art space in order to create 
an interpretative slide that would be added to a collective powerpoint 
(Fig 1, below, Student's interpretive slide of William Pope. L's Art Crawl 
in Houston, Texas). One student who participated in the crawl created 
crawling 
YOUf progress is·sl'OwGr than you 
ever ilt1aghfed. 
You ate intImate with Wavlty 
Your vllinel'abili ty is ine !.#Ipable. 
You tluctuate betwe(ln p~tacJe and 
jni ibi lity. 
YOll fhink only of-the next few inches. 
Vori cm1 n01 bear to think any fimheJ'. 
You accept your p!lin as inevitfible. 
'YOll realize that i hurts (00 omc:h to raise 
your head, 10 el your sights. 
You forget thai you one c{iuldwalk. 
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a slide that effectively shared her experience by revealing how 
impossible sharing that experience in any way other than experiencing 
it could.(lJ 
Over a faint background of crawlers approaching towering 
downtown, text literally crawled in from the right side of the screen to 
surround images of a crawl team and the singular crawling student. 
The text invokes the bod y' s intimacy / extension to the street and issues 
of vision, stating that the crawler fluctuated between spectacle and 
invisibility and a major effect of crawling was the pain associated with 
raising your head in order to "set your sights." 
In this art crawl, William Pope. L opened up experience to involve 
other people quite literally enacting a cyborg extension of the body to 
asphalt and the rhizome of the crawl in that each participant became a 
singular, yet multiple, grass shoot of the experience. Politically 
involving the horizontal bodies collectively, yet mobilizing them 
separately, the art crawl opened up experience rupturing the status 
quo perceptions of the participants and of the Houston community. 
In summary, this experience was one of critical perception-an 
experience that invited seeing otherwise and enacted imaginative 
possibilities for looking and experiencing in a social realm. Thoughts 
were manifested not in the realm of the "what is" but rather in the 
realm of the "what could be." William Pope. L's art crawl critiqued the 
social constraints of the privilege of verticality giving us cause to see 
otherwise, and pause to be otherwise. The revelation of structures of 
power challenged our usually distanced vision and enacted a situated, 
attitudinally-open, accumulation of views critically looking for 
connections. 
Resistence, Rupture, Art & Democracy 
In the artworld, resistance has always played a major role precisely 
because of its critical exhortation of experience: "resistance and conflict 
have always been factors in generating art; and they are, as we have 
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seen, a necessary part of artistic form" (Dewey 1934, p. 339). 
Consequently, "the first stirrings of dissatisfaction and the first 
intimations of a better future are always found in works of art" (p. 
346). Arresting the spectacle, uprooting the tree, and rupturing the 
status quo give art the ability to enact, or at least seriously investigate, 
virtualities-the realm of what could be. The lines of flight producing 
virtualities begin from blocs, tension, and resistance. Rupture thus 
becomes another name for responding in the future to such blockage. 
Anything that interrupts the proliferation of seamless experience 
ruptures. To enact the capacity to AND is to rupture, and the infinite 
variability that inheres in such a capacity is what leads to an active 
sense of democracy. In this sense, democracy is never achieved but 
constantly in process. 
Art plays a crucial role in critically perceiving experience in ways 
that activate our ideas of resistance, rupture and democracy. Mapping 
art as a rhizome suggests future possibilities while subverting 
stagnating ideas of the status quo. Art education, despite its rhizomatic 
subject, is one such arena that embodies tendencies to become a tree. 
What is necessary is a re-situation, that is to say a mapping of the 
connective and ambiguous routes of the rhizome, so as to open up 
possibilities for art education in the future. 
Rhizomatic Art Education: 
Social Theory in a Post-Cartesian World 
Dewey (1920/1957) argued that "full education comes only when 
there is a responsible share on the part of each person, in proportion to 
capacity, in shaping the aims and policies of the social groups to which 
he [sic] belongs" (p. 209). The realization of each individual's 
connectedness to the benefits and ills of society echoes the results of 
critical experience in art education. Openness to such connections is 
predicated on the ability to perceive them, and as argued previously, 
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this does not generally occur with Cartesian vision. Previously, 
democracy was actively positioned, as a verb always in motion. 
Education must be similarly conceived. Neither should be conceived 
as a fixed locale at which we rest once we are believed to have achieved 
them. Rather, democracy and education must constantly vary, change, 
connect, and move, as along a rhizome. In such conceptions of 
democracy and education, authoritative vision has no place; multiple 
perspectives connect to create knowledge and possibility. Rhizomatic 
art education cultivates this idea. 
Dewey (1916) further exhorts an active understanding of both 
education and democracy by pointing out the oppressive results and 
abuses of power in a society that does not value or perceive connections: 
A society which is mobile, which is full of channels for the 
distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it 
that its members are educated to personal initiative and 
adaptability. Otherwise, they will be overwhelmed by the 
changes in which they are caught and whose significance 
or connections they do not perceive. The result will be a 
confusion in which a few will appropriate to themselves 
the results of the blind and externally directed activities of 
others. (pp. 87-88) 
Education in a critical sense has the elimination of such oppressive, 
non-democratic ways of life at its core, and connective vision as 
exercised in rhizomatic art education plays a crucial role in achieving 
such critical education. 
The recognition of the intertwining verbing of democracy and 
education denies the development of trees in preference for rhizomes. 
Such an idea places a premium on education that is connective and 
open, ambiguous, imaginative, and dwelling in possibility. Rhizomatic 
art education enacts such critical components ever striving toward 
democracy and education. However, responsibility for partial visions 
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and attitudes toward change and resistance rests with each person 
because each of us is "subject to the influence of custom and inertia, 
and has to protect himself [/herselfl from its influences by a deliberate 
openness to life itself" (Dewey, 1934, p. 304). Rhizomatic art education 
enacts such deliberate openness by emphasizing the partiality and 
limitations of vision requiring constant re-visioning of imaginative and 
connective possibilities. 
Conclusion 
In her essay" Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's 
Artwork Essay Reconsidered" (1992/1997), Susan Buck-Morss explores 
Marx's factory model as described by Benjamin (p. 389) and argues 
that in this kind of model the "goal is to numb the organism, to deaden 
the senses, to repress memory" Cp. 390). She goes on to argue that in 
such a "crisis in perception," education's goal must be in "restoring 
'perceptibility'" (p. 390). If this is not the agenda of education, Buck-
Morss exhorts that the eyes see too much and yet see nothing: "Thus, 
the simultaneity of overstimulation and numbness ... destroys the 
human organism's power to respond politically" (p. 390). 
The invocation of the metaphors of the rhizome and the cyborg, 
as Docherty (1996) suggests, requires the abandonment of the idea of 
education as correction Cp. 81). This means abandoning our usual way 
of understanding wherein alterity is reduced to identity characterized 
by a "colonization of the space of alterity and the collapsing of that 
complex and three-dimensional space into the narrow but reassuring 
confines of the two-dimensional and stereotypical mirror" (p. 83). Such 
an attitude requires advocacy for the complex, the confusing, the 
ambiguous. 
The costs of continuing to reduce education to a method of 
correction are far-reaching. Continued monocular views of know ledge 
in education create a citizenry that is hesitant and unsure of their own 
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ability to deal with complex ideas and create hypostasized 
understandings of the world, wherein difference is to be feared, not 
valued as the basis of democratic life. In conclusion, this essay has 
explored the problems inherent in unexamined Cartesian vision and 
explicated the ramifications of such vision continuing to function 
unchecked. Democracy and education are at stake. Rhizomatic art 
education keeps a complexified understanding of vision at the forefront. 
Complexified vision enacts the rhizome celebrating its connectedness 
and its openness. Such vision requires alternatives to binaries of 
domination and submission, subject and object and creates 
corresponding attitudes of openness resulting in multiple active 
perspectives, aware of their limitations. Such limitations necessitate 
the cyborg, the rhizome-a connected understanding of who we are 
that is bigger than ourselves. Even though it means more work, viewing 
ourselves as connected entities, we see the value of who we are when 
we are multiplied, when we value difference, as epitomized in another's 
point of view. Only with this kind of re-visioned vision, can we begin 
to live in a world where we can go elsewhere, and imagine something 
else to be. 
Notes 
(I) Thanks to Tria Wood for sharing her slide and her ideas about 
the art crawl. 
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